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E-Bombs Part 4 of 4
Strategic
Air Attack Operations using Electromagnetic Bombs
The
modern approach to strategic air warfare reflects in many respects aspects of
the IW model, in that much effort is expended in disabling an opponent’s
fundamental information processing infrastructure. Since we however are yet to
see a systematic IW doctrine which has been tested in combat, this paper will
approach the subject from a more conservative viewpoint and use established
strategic doctrine.
Modern
strategic air attack theory is based upon Warden’s Five Rings model, which
identifies five centres of gravity in a nation’s war fighting capability. In
descending order of importance, these are the nation’s leadership and
supporting C3 system, its essential economic infrastructure, its transportation
network, its population and its fielded military forces.
Electromagnetic
weapons may be productively used against all elements in this model, and provide
a particularly high payoff when applied against a highly industrialised and
geographically concentrated opponent. Of particular importance in the context of
strategic air attack, is that while electromagnetic weapons are lethal to
electronics, they have little if any effect on humans. This is a characteristic
which is not shared with established conventional and nuclear weapons.
This
selectivity in lethal effect makes electromagnetic weapons far more readily
applicable to a strategic air attack campaign, and reduces the internal
political pressure which is experienced by the leadership of any democracy which
must commit to warfare. An opponent may be rendered militarily, politically and
economically ineffective with little if any loss in human life.
The
innermost ring in the Warden model essentially comprises government
bureaucracies and civilian and military C3 systems. In any modern nation these
are heavily dependent upon the use of computer equipment and communications
equipment. What is of key importance at this time is an ongoing change in the
structure of computing facilities used in such applications, as these are
becoming increasingly decentralised. A modern office environment relies upon a
large number of small computers, networked to interchange information, in which
respect it differs from the traditional model of using a small number of
powerful central machines.
This
decentralisation and networking of information technology systems produces a
major vulnerability to electromagnetic attack. Whereas a small number of larger
computers could be defended against electromagnetic attack by the use of
electromagnetic hardened computer rooms, a large distributed network cannot.
Moreover, unless optical fibre networking is used, the networking cables are
themselves a medium via which electromagnetic effects can be efficiently
propagated throughout the network, to destroy machines. Whilst the use of
distributed computer networks reduces vulnerability to attack by conventional
munitions, it increases vulnerability to attack by electromagnetic weapons.
Selective
targeting of government buildings with electromagnetic weapons will result in a
substantial reduction in a government’s ability to handle and process
information. The damage inflicted upon information records may be permanent,
should inappropriate backup strategies have been used to protect stored data. It
is reasonable to expect most data stored on machines which are affected will
perish with the host machine, or become extremely difficult to recover from
damaged storage devices.
The
cost of hardening existing computer networks is prohibitive, as is the cost of
replacement with hardened equipment. Whilst the use of hardened equipment for
critical tasks would provide some measure of resilience, the required discipline
in the handling of information required to implement such a scheme renders its
utility outside of military organisations questionable. Therefore the use of
electromagnetic weapons against government facilities offers an exceptionally
high payoff.
Other
targets which fall into the innermost ring may also be profitably attacked.
Satellite link and importantly control facilities are vital means of
communication as well as the primary interface to military and commercial
reconnaissance satellites. Television and radio broadcasting stations, one of
the most powerful tools of any government, are also vulnerable to
electromagnetic attack due the very high concentration of electronic equipment
in such sites. Telephone exchanges, particularly later generation digital
switching systems, are also highly vulnerable to appropriate electromagnetic
attack.
In
summary the use of electromagnetic weapons against leadership and C3 targets is
highly profitable, in that a modest number of weapons appropriately used can
introduce the sought state of strategic paralysis, without the substantial costs
incurred by the use of conventional munitions to achieve the same effect.
Essential
economic infrastructure is also vulnerable to electromagnetic attack. The
finance industry and stock markets are almost wholly dependent upon computers
and their supporting communications. Manufacturing, chemical, petroleum product
industries and metallurgical industries rely heavily upon automation which is
almost universally implemented with electronic PLC (Programmable Logic
Controller) systems or digital computers. Furthermore, most sensors and
telemetry devices used are electrical or electronic.
Attacking
such economic targets with electromagnetic weapons will halt operations for the
time required to either repair the destroyed equipment, or to reconfigure for
manual operation. Some production processes however require automated operation,
either because hazardous conditions prevent human intervention, or the
complexity of the control process required cannot be carried out by a human
operator in real time. A good instance are larger chemical, petrochemical and
oil/gas production facilities. Destroying automated control facilities will
therefore result in substantial loss of production, causing shortages of these
vital materials.
Manufacturing
industries which rely heavily upon robotic and semiautomatic machinery, such as
the electronics, computer and electrical industry, precision machine industry
and aerospace industries, are all key assets in supporting a military
capability. They are all highly vulnerable to electromagnetic attack. Whilst
material processing industries may in some instances be capable of function with
manual process control, the manufacturing industries are almost wholly dependent
upon their automated machines to achieve any useful production output.
Historical
experience suggests that manufacturing industries are highly resilient to air
attack as production machinery is inherently mechanically robust and thus a very
high blast overpressure is required to destroy it. The proliferation of
electronic and computer controlled machinery has produced a major vulnerability,
for which historical precedent does not exist. Therefore it will be necessary to
reevaluate this orthodoxy in targeting strategy.
The
finance industry and stock markets are a special case in this context, as the
destruction of their electronic infrastructure can yield, unlike manufacturing
industries, much faster economic dislocation. This can in turn produce large
systemic effects across a whole economy, including elements which are not
vulnerable to direct electromagnetic attack. This may be of particular relevance
when dealing with an opponent which does not have a large and thus vulnerable
manufacturing economy. Nations which rely on agriculture, mining or trade for a
large proportion of the their gross domestic product are prime candidates for
electromagnetic attack on their finance industry and stock markets. Since the
latter are usually geographically concentrated and typically electromagnetically
“soft” targets, they are highly vulnerable.
In
summary there is a large payoff in striking at economic essentials with
electromagnetic weapons, particularly in the opening phase of a strategic air
attack campaign, as economic activity may be halted or reduced with modest
expenditure of the attacker’s resources. An important caveat is that centres
of gravity within the target economy must be properly identified and prioritised
for strikes to ensure that maximum effect is achieved as quickly as possible.
Transport
infrastructure is the third ring in the Warden model, and also offers some
useful opportunities for the application of electromagnetic weapons. Unlike the
innermost rings, the concentration of electronic and computer equipment is
typically much lower, and therefore considerable care must be taken in the
selection of targets.
Railway
and road signalling systems, where automated, are most vulnerable to
electromagnetic attack on their control centres. This could be used to produce
traffic congestion by preventing the proper scheduling of rail traffic, and
disabling road traffic signalling, although the latter may not yield
particularly useful results.
Significantly,
most modern automobiles and trucks use electronic ignition systems which are
known to be vulnerable to electromagnetic weapons effects, although
opportunities to find such concentrations so as to allow the profitable use of
an electromagnetic bomb may be scarce.
The
population of the target nation is the fourth ring in the Warden model, and its
morale is the object of attack. The morale of the population will be affected
significantly by the quality and quantity of the government propaganda it is
subjected to, as will it be affected by living conditions.
Using
electromagnetic weapons against urban areas provides the opportunity to prevent
government propaganda from reaching the population via means of mass media,
through the damaging or destruction of all television and radio receivers within
the footprint of the weapon. Whether this is necessary, given that broadcast
facilities may have already been destroyed, is open to discussion. Arguably it
may be counterproductive, as it will prevent the target population from being
subjected to friendly means of psychological warfare such as propaganda
broadcasts.
The
use of electromagnetic weapons against a target population is therefore an area
which requires careful consideration in the context of the overall IW campaign
strategy. If useful objectives can be achieved by isolating the population from
government propaganda, then the population is a valid target for electromagnetic
attack. Forces constrained by treaty obligations will have to reconcile this
against the applicable regulations relating to denial of services to
non-combatants.
The
outermost and last ring in the Warden model are the fielded military forces.
These are by all means a target vulnerable to electromagnetic attack, and C3
nodes, fixed support bases as well as deployed forces should be attacked with
electromagnetic devices. Fixed support bases which carry out depot level
maintenance on military equipment offer a substantial payoff, as the
concentration of computers in both automatic test equipment and administrative
and logistic support functions offers a good return per expended weapon.
Any
site where more complex military equipment is concentrated should be attacked
with electromagnetic weapons to render the equipment unserviceable and hence
reduce the fighting capability, and where possible also mobility of the targeted
force. As discussed earlier in the context of Electronic Combat, the ability of
an electromagnetic weapon to achieve hard electrical kills against any
non-hardened targets within its lethal footprint suggests that some target sites
may only require electromagnetic attack to render them both undefended and
non-operational. Whether to expend conventional munitions on targets in this
state would depend on the immediate military situation.
In
summary the use of electromagnetic weapons in strategic air attack campaign
offers a potentially high payoff, particularly when applied to leadership, C3
and vital economic targets, all of which may be deprived of much of their
function for substantial periods of time. The massed application of
electromagnetic weapons in the opening phase of the campaign would introduce
paralysis within the government, deprived of much of its information processing
infrastructure, as well as paralysis in most vital industries. This would
greatly reduce the capability of the target nation to conduct military
operations of any substantial intensity.
Because
conventional electromagnetic weapons produce negligible collateral damage, in
comparison with conventional explosive munitions, they allow the conduct of an
effective and high tempo campaign without the loss of life which is typical of
conventional campaigns. This will make the option of a strategic bombing
campaign more attractive to a Western democracy, where mass media coverage of
the results of conventional strategic strike operations will adversely affect
domestic civilian morale.
The
long term effects of a sustained and concentrated strategic bombing campaign
using a combination of conventional and electromagnetic weapons will be
important. The cost of computer and communications infrastructure is
substantial, and its massed destruction would be a major economic burden for any
industrialised nation. In addition it is likely that poor protection of stored
data will add to further economic losses, as much data will be lost with the
destroyed machines.
From
the perspective of conducting an IW campaign, this method of attack achieves
many of the central objectives sought. Importantly, the massed application of
electromagnetic weapons would inflict attrition on an opponent’s information
processing infrastructure very rapidly, and this would arguably add a further
psychological dimension to the potency of the attack. Unlike the classical IW
model of Gibsonian CyberWar, in which the opponent can arguably isolate his
infrastructure from hostile penetration, parallel or hyperwar style massed
attack with electromagnetic bombs will be extremely difficult to defend against.
Offensive
Counter Air (OCA) Operations using Electromagnetic Bombs
Electromagnetic
bombs may be usefully applied to OCA operations. Modern aircraft are densely
packed with electronics, and unless properly hardened, are highly vulnerable
targets for electromagnetic weapons.
The
cost of the onboard electronics represents a substantial fraction of the total
cost of a modern military aircraft, and therefore stock levels of spares will in
most instances be limited to what is deemed necessary to cover operational usage
at some nominal sortie rate. Therefore electromagnetic damage could render
aircraft unusable for substantial periods of time.
Attacking
airfields with electromagnetic weapons will disable communications, air traffic
control facilities, navigational aids and operational support equipment, if
these items are not suitably electromagnetic hardened. Conventional blast
hardening measures will not be effective, as electrical power and fixed
communications cabling will carry electromagnetic induced transients into most
buildings. Hardened aircraft shelters may provide some measure of protection due
electrically conductive reinforcement embedded in the concrete, but conventional
revetments will not.
Therefore
OCA operations against airfields and aircraft on the ground should include the
use of electromagnetic weapons as they offer the potential to substantially
reduce hostile sortie rates.
Maritime
Air Operations using Electromagnetic Bombs
As
with modern military aircraft, naval surface combatants are fitted with a
substantial volume of electronic equipment, performing similar functions in
detecting and engaging targets and warning of attack. As such they are
vulnerable to electromagnetic attack, if not suitably hardened. Should they be
hardened, volumetric, weight and cost penalties will be incurred.
Conventional
methods for attacking surface combatants involve the use of saturation attacks
by anti-ship missiles or coordinated attacks using a combination of ARMs and
anti-ship missiles. The latter instance is where disabling the target
electronically by stripping its antennae precedes lethal attack with specialised
anti-ship weapons.
An
electromagnetic warhead detonated within lethal radius of a surface combatant
will render its air defence system inoperable, as well as damaging other
electronic equipment such as electronic countermeasures, electronic support
measures and communications. This leaves the vessel undefended until these
systems can be restored, which may or may not be possible on the high seas.
Therefore launching an electromagnetic glidebomb on to a surface combatant, and
then reducing it with laser or television guided weapons is an alternate
strategy for dealing with such targets.
Battlefield
Air Interdiction Operations using Electromagnetic Bombs
Modern
land warfare doctrine emphasises mobility, and manoeuvre warfare methods are
typical for contemporary land warfare. Coordination and control are essential to
the successful conduct of manoeuvre operations, and this provides another
opportunity to apply electromagnetic weapons. Communications and command sites
are key elements in the structure of such a land army, and these concentrate
communications and computer equipment. Therefore they should be attacked with
electromagnetic weapons, to disrupt the command and control of land operations.
Should
concentrations of armoured vehicles be found, these are also profitable targets
for electromagnetic attack, as their communications and fire control systems may
be substantially damaged or disabled as a result. A useful tactic would be
initial attack with electromagnetic weapons to create a maximum of confusion,
followed by attack with conventional weapons to take advantage of the immediate
situation.
Defensive
Counter-Air (DCA) and Air Defence Operations using Electromagnetic Warheads
Providing
that compact electromagnetic warheads can be built with useful lethality
performance, then a number of other potential applications become viable. One is
to equip an Air-Air Missile (AAM) with such a warhead. A weapon with datalink
midcourse guidance, such as the AIM-120, could be used to break up inbound raids
by causing soft or hard electrical kills in a formation (raid) of hostile
aircraft. Should this be achieved, the defending fighter will have the advantage
in any following engagement as the hostile aircraft may not be fully mission
capable. Loss of air intercept or nav attack radar, EW equipment, mission
computers, digital engine controls, communications and electronic flight
controls, where fitted, could render the victim aircraft defenceless against
attack with conventional missiles.
This
paradigm may also be applied to air defence operations using area defence SAMs.
Large SAMs such as the MIM-104 Patriot, RIM-66E/M and RIM-67A Standard,
5V55/48N6 (SA-10) and 9M82/9M83 (SA-12) could accommodate an electromagnetic
warhead comparable in size to a bomb warhead. A SAM site subjected to jamming by
inbound bombers could launch a first round under datalink control with an
electromagnetic warhead to disable the bombers, and then follow with
conventional rounds against targets which may not be able to defend themselves
electronically. This has obvious implications for the electromagnetic hardness
of combat aircraft systems.
A
Strategy of Graduated Response
The
introduction of non-nuclear electromagnetic bombs into the arsenal of a modern
air force considerably broadens the options for conducting strategic campaigns.
Clearly such weapons are potent force multipliers in conducting a conventional
war, particularly when applied to Electronic Combat, OCA and strategic air
attack operations.
The
massed use of such weapons would provide a decisive advantage to any nation with
the capability to effectively target and deliver them. The qualitative advantage
in capability so gained would provide a significant advantage even against a
much stronger opponent not in the possession of this capability.
Electromagnetic
weapons however open up less conventional alternatives for the conduct of a
strategic campaign, which derive from their ability to inflict significant
material damage without inflicting visible collateral damage and loss of life.
Western governments have been traditionally reluctant to commit to strategic
campaigns, as the expectation of a lengthy and costly battle, with mass media
coverage of its highly visible results, will quickly produce domestic political
pressure to cease the conflict.
An
alternative is a Strategy of Graduated Response (SGR). In this strategy, an
opponent who threatens escalation to a full scale war is preemptively attacked
with electromagnetic weapons, to gain command of the electromagnetic spectrum
and command of the air. Selective attacks with electromagnetic weapons may then
be applied against chosen strategic targets, to force concession. Should these
fail to produce results, more targets may be disabled by electromagnetic attack.
Escalation would be sustained and graduated, to produce steadily increasing
pressure to concede the dispute. Air and sea blockade are complementary means
via which pressure may be applied.
Because
electromagnetic weapons can cause damage on a large scale very quickly, the rate
at which damage can be inflicted can be very rapid, in which respect such a
campaign will differ from the conventional, where the rate at which damage is
inflicted is limited by the usable sortie rate of strategic air attack capable
assets.
Should
blockade and the total disabling of vital economic assets fail to yield results,
these may then be systematically reduced by conventional weapons, to further
escalate the pressure. Finally, a full scale conventional strategic air attack
campaign would follow, to wholly destroy the hostile nation’s warfighting
capability.
Another
situation where electromagnetic bombs may find useful application is in dealing
with governments which actively implement a policy of state sponsored terrorism
or info-terrorism, or alternately choose to conduct a sustained low intensity
land warfare campaign. Again the Strategy of Graduated Response, using
electromagnetic bombs in the initial phases, would place the government under
significant pressure to concede.
Importantly,
high value targets such as R&D and production sites for Weapons of Mass
Destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) and many vital economic sites, such
as petrochemical production facilities, are critically dependent upon high
technology electronic equipment. The proliferation of WMD into developing
nations has been greatly assisted by the availability of high quality test and
measurement equipment commercially available from First World nations, as well
as modern electronic process control equipment. Selectively destroying such
equipment can not only paralyse R&D effort, but also significantly impair
revenue generating production effort. A Middle Eastern nation sponsoring
terrorism will use oil revenue to support such activity. Crippling its primary
source of revenue without widespread environmental pollution may be an effective
and politically acceptable punitive measure.
As
a punitive weapon electromagnetic devices are attractive for dealing with
belligerent governments. Substantial economic, military and political damage may
be inflicted with a modest commitment of resources by their users, and without
politically damaging loss of life.
Conclusions
Electromagnetic
bombs are Weapons of Electrical Mass Destruction with applications across a
broad spectrum of targets, spanning both the strategic and tactical. As such
their use offers a very high payoff in attacking the fundamental information
processing and communication facilities of a target system. The massed
application of these weapons will produce substantial paralysis in any target
system, thus providing a decisive advantage in the conduct of Electronic Combat,
Offensive Counter Air and Strategic Air Attack.
Because
E-bombs can cause hard electrical kills over larger areas than conventional
explosive weapons of similar mass, they offer substantial economies in force
size for a given level of inflicted damage, and are thus a potent force
multiplier for appropriate target sets.
The
non-lethal nature of electromagnetic weapons makes their use far less
politically damaging than that of conventional munitions, and therefore broadens
the range of military options available.
This
paper has included a discussion of the technical, operational and targeting
aspects of using such weapons, as no historical experience exists as yet upon
which to build a doctrinal model. The immaturity of this weapons technology
limits the scope of this discussion, and many potential areas of application
have intentionally not been discussed. The ongoing technological evolution of
this family of weapons will clarify the relationship between weapon size and
lethality, thus producing further applications and areas for study.
E-bombs can be an affordable force multiplier for military forces which are under post Cold War pressures to reduce force sizes, increasing both their combat potential and political utility in resolving disputes. Given the potentially high payoff deriving from the use of these devices, it is incumbent upon such military forces to appreciate both the offensive and defensive implications of this technology. It is also incumbent upon governments and private industry to consider the implications of the proliferation of this technology, and take measures to safeguard their vital assets from possible future attack. Those who choose not to may become losers in any future wars.
High-power
microwave (HPM) / E-Bomb
High-power
microwave (HPM) sources have been under investigation for several years as
potential weapons for a variety of combat, sabotage, and terrorist applications.
Due to classification restrictions, details of this work are relatively unknown
outside the military community and its contractors. A key point to recognize is
the insidious nature of HPM. Due to the gigahertz-band frequencies (4 to 20 GHz)
involved, HPM has the capability to penetrate not only radio front-ends, but
also the most minute shielding penetrations throughout the equipment. At
sufficiently high levels, as discussed, the potential exists for significant
damage to devices and circuits. For these reasons, HPM should be of interest to
the broad spectrum of EMC practitioners.
Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) and High Powered Microwave (HMP) Weapons offer a significant
capability against electronic equipment susceptible to damage by transient power
surges. This weapon generates a very short, intense energy pulse producing a
transient surge of thousands of volts that kills semiconductor devices. The
conventional EMP and HMP weapons can disable non-shielded electronic devices
including practically any modern electronic device within the effective range of
the weapon.
The
effectiveness of an EMP device is determined by the power generated and the
characteristic of the pulse. The shorter pulse wave forms, such as microwaves,
are far more effective against electronic equipment and more difficult to harden
against. Current efforts focus on converting the energy from an explosive
munitions to supply the electromagnetic pulse. This method produces significant
levels of directionally focused electromagnetic energy.
Future
advances may provide the compactness needed to weaponize the capability in a
bomb or missile warhead. Currently, the radius of the weapon is not as great as
nuclear EMP effects. Open literature sources indicate that effective radii of
“hundreds of meters or more” are possible. EMP and HPM devices can disable a
large variety of military or infrastructure equipment over a relatively broad
area. This can be useful for dispersed targets.
A
difficulty is determining the appropriate level of energy to achieve the desired
effects. This will require detailed knowledge of the target equipment and the
environment (walls, buildings). The obvious counter-measure is the shielding or
hardening of electronic equipment. Currently, only critical military equipment
is hardened e.g., strategic command and control systems. Hardening of existing
equipment is difficult and adds significant weight and expense. As a result, a
large variety of commercial and military equipment will be susceptible to this
type of attack.
The
US Navy reportedly used a new class of highly secret, non-nuclear
electromagnetic pulse warheads during the opening hours of the Persian Gulf War
to disrupt and destroy Iraqi electronics systems. The warheads converted the
energy of a conventional explosion into a pulse of radio energy. The effect of
the microwave attacks on Iraqi air defense and headquarters was difficult to
determine because the effects of the HPM blasts were obscured by continuous
jamming, the use of stealthy F-117 aircraft, and the destruction of Iraq’s
electrical grid. The warheads used during the Gulf War were experimental
warheads, not standard weapons deployed with fielded forces.
Col.
William G. Heckathorn, commander of the Phillips Research Site and the deputy
director of the Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research
Laboratory, was presented the Legion of Merit medal during special retirement
ceremonies in May 1998. In a citation accompanying the medal, Col. Heckathorn
was praised for having provided superior vision, leadership, and direct guidance
that resulted in the first high-power microwave weapon prototypes delivered to
the warfighter. The citation noted that “Col. Heckathorn united all directed
energy development within Army, Navy and Air Force, which resulted in an
efficient, focused, warfighter-oriented tri-service research program.” In
December of 1994 he came to Kirtland to become the director of the Advanced
Weapons and Survivability Directorate at the Phillips Laboratory. Last year he
became the commander of the Phillips Laboratory while still acting as the
director of the Advanced Weapons and Survivability Directorate.
As
with a conventional munition, a microwave munition is a “single shot”
munition that has a similar blast and fragmentation radius. However, while the
explosion produces a blast, the primary mission is to generate the energy that
powers the microwave device. Thus, for a microwave munition, the primary kill
mechanism is the microwave energy, which greatly increases the radius and the
footprint by, in some cases, several orders of magnitude. For example, a
2000-pound microwave munition will have a minimum radius of approximately 200
meters, or footprint of approximately 126,000 square meters.
Studies
have examined the incorporation of a high power microwave weapon into the
weapons bay of a conceptual uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. The CONOPS,
electromagnetic compatibility and hardening (to avoid a self-kill), power
requirements and potential power supplies, and antenna characteristics have been
analyzed. Extensive simulations of potential antennas have been performed. The
simulations examined the influence of the aircraft structure on the antenna
patterns and the levels of leakage through apertures in the weapons bay. Other
investigations examined issues concerning the electromagnetic shielding
effectiveness of composite aircraft structures.
Collateral
damage from E-bombs is dependent on the size and design of the specific bomb. An
E-bomb that utilizes explosive power to obtain its damaging microwaves will
result in typical blast and shrapnel damage. Ideally, an E-Bomb would be
designed to minimize and dissipate most of the mechanical collateral damage.
Human exposure to microwave radiation is hazardous within several meters of the
epicenter. However, there is a relatively low risk of bodily damage at further
distances.
Any non-military electronics within range of the E-bomb that have not been protected have a high probability of being damaged or destroyed. The best way to defend against E-bomb attack is to destroy the platform or delivery vehicle in which the E-bomb resides. Another method of protection is to keep all essential electronics within an electrically conductive enclosure, called a Faraday cage. This prevents the damaging electromagnetic field from interacting with vital equipment. The problem with Faraday cages is that most vital equipment needs to be in contact with the outside world. This contact point can allow the electromagnetic field to enter the cage, which ultimately renders the enclosure useless. There are ways to protect against these Faraday cage flaws, but the fact remains that this is a dangerous weakpoint. In most circumstances E-bombs are categorized as ‘non-lethal weapons’ because of the minimal collateral damage they create. The E-bomb’s ‘non-lethal’ categorization gives military commanders more politically-friendly options to choose from.
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